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I.  INTRODUCTION
The mission of public health [is] fulfilling society’s interest in as-
suring conditions in which people can be healthy.1
Preserving the public health is among the most important
goals of government, and law is essential in helping to achieve this
goal.  Public health law contemplates the responsibilities of indi-
viduals and the duties of government to act for the health of soci-
ety.  Laws define the jurisdiction of public health officials and
specify the manner in which they may exercise their authority.
Laws can also establish norms for healthy behavior and create the
social conditions in which people can be healthy.  Legislatures,
courts, and administrative agencies serve as conduits for social de-
bates on important public health issues within the legal language of
rights, duties, and justice.  As one public health lawyer has aptly
stated, “[t]he field of public health . . . could not long exist in the
manner in which we know it today except for its sound legal ba-
sis.”2  In a forthcoming book, we define the field of public health
law as both the study of the legal powers and state duties necessary
to assure the conditions of public health, and limitations on state
power to constrain individuals’ rights in the interests of community
health.3
In its foundational 1988 text, The Future of Public Health, the
Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) agreed that law was essential for
furthering public health, but questioned the soundness of public
health law in the United States.4  The IOM concluded that the
United States “has lost sight of its public health goals and has al-
lowed the system of public health activities to fall into disarray,”5
1. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 7 (1988).
2. FRANK P. GRAD, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW MANUAL 4 (2d ed. 1990); see also
Scott Burris, Thoughts on the Law and the Public’s Health, 22 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
141 (1994); Lawrence O. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J.L. &
MED. 461, 464 (1986).
3. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:  POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT (forthcoming 2000).
4. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 146-150.
5. Id. at 19; see also LAURIE GARRETT, THE COMING PLAGUE:  NEWLY
EMERGING DISEASES IN A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE 512 (1994) (claiming that the
U.S. public health system exhibits levels of chaos and inaccuracy comparable to
those of third world countries); Lawrence O. Gostin, Securing Health or Just
Health Care?  The Effect of the Health Care System on the Health of America, 39
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due partly to obsolete and inadequate state laws and regulations.
Though its bleak view is not universally accepted,6 the IOM further
recommended that
states review their public health statutes and make revisions nec-
essary to accomplish the following two objectives:  [i] clearly de-
lineate the basic authority and responsibility entrusted to public
health agencies, boards, and officials at the state and local levels
and the relationships between them; and [ii] support a set of
modern disease control measures that address contemporary
health problems . . . , and incorporate due process safeguards
(notice, hearings, administrative review, right to counsel, stan-
dards of evidence).7
In response to this challenge, some states have updated and
revised their public health laws since 1988.  Most, however, have
not.  In many states, public health law remains ripe for reform.
Pursuant to a comprehensive survey of communicable disease law
in the fifty states, we suggest existing state statutes are ineffective
in responding to contemporary health threats for many reasons.8
These statutes often (1) pre-date modern scientific and constitu-
tional developments; (2) fail to equip public health officials with a
range of flexible powers needed to control infectious disease; (3)
lack adequate standards of privacy, due process, and risk assess-
ment; and (4) are based on arbitrary disease classification schemes
that no longer relate to modern disease threats or epidemiologic
methods of infection control.9
The need for public health law reform is well-stated by the
IOM and others.  Yet, confusion regarding the field of public
health law has confounded meaningful proposals for reform at-
tempted by public health officials, state legislators, and the general
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 16-17 (1994) (claiming that an array of public health services,
not simply personal medical services, reduces morbidity and premature mortality).
6. See Leonard Robins & Charles Backstrom, The Role of State Health De-
partments in Formulating Policy:  A Survey on the Case of AIDS, 84 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 905 (1994) (finding health agencies took leadership role in HIV policy).
7. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 10; see, e.g., Centers for Disease
Control & Prevention, Public Health Core Functions--Alabama, Maryland, Missis-
sippi, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Wisconsin 1993 43 (Morbidity & Mortality
Wkly. Rep. 13 1994) (concluding that existing public health law too often fails to
support public health departments in carrying out their core functions).  More
broadly, the IOM criticized health departments’ alleged failure to provide clear
political leadership in the legislative responses to important issues, such as HIV.
See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 4-5.
8. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public’s Health:  A
Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59 (1999).
9. See id. at 101-18.
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public in many states.  To address this, we have conducted compre-
hensive public health law case studies in several states (e.g., New
Hampshire, Virginia, and Oregon) in an attempt to facilitate the
understanding of public health law, as well as to provide objective,
scholarly recommendations for legal and institutional reform.
These studies reveal vastly different legal structures for the public
health systems within each of these jurisdictions.  Our case study in
Alaska revealed perhaps the most complex and interesting system
of public health law, presenting creative opportunities for reform.
In this Article, we present the findings of our study on the im-
provement of public health law in Alaska.  We examine and ana-
lyze the public health laws supporting the state’s public health sys-
tem.  The fact that Alaska has attained statehood comparatively
recently, and has a governing structure involving state, municipal,
rural, and tribal entities presents unique opportunities for the State
to improve its public health system and its supporting legal infra-
structure.
Part II begins with a framework that examines public health as
a distinct field of law and policy.  It briefly reviews and defines
public health law within the constitutional structure of the United
States.  The Constitution limits government power in two ways:  (1)
it divides federal power among three branches of government. and
(2) it allocates power between the federal government and the
states.  The tripartite separation of powers protects individual lib-
erties and the ideology of federalism protects state sovereignty.
Although the Constitution does not obligate the federal or state
government to act in the interests of public health, the federal gov-
ernment draws its expansive authority to act in the field of public
health from specific, enumerated powers provided within the Con-
stitution.  These powers include the power to raise revenue for
public health services and, through its Commerce power, to regu-
late, both directly and indirectly, private activities that endanger
human health.
Principles of new federalism, however, challenge the extent to
which federal powers may lawfully extend into areas of traditional
state concern, such as public health.  Pursuant to the Tenth
Amendment, states retain their sovereign powers.  State police
powers - or the inherent authority of the state to protect, preserve,
and promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the
public - represent the state’s residual authority to act in the inter-
ests of the public health.  Local governments, including counties or
boroughs, municipalities, and special districts, share public health
authority through specific delegations of state police power.
Part III examines the legal authority for public health in
Alaska through a comprehensive description of the constitutional,
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statutory, and administrative laws underlying public health practice
in the state and among tribal jurisdications.  Like the federal Con-
stitution, the Alaska Constitution sets limits on the powers of the
state while providing affirmative grants of governmental powers.
The Alaska Constitution guarantees many individual rights which
specifically authorize the state legislature to promote and protect
the public health and public welfare.10  Part III reviews an array of
statutes enacted by the Alaska Legislature, charging various state
and local governmental agencies and departments to regulate and
implement traditional public health functions.
Most public health matters in Alaska are administered by one
of two state agencies, the Department of Health and Social Serv-
ices (“DHSS”) and the Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion (“DEC”).  DHSS is primarily responsible for the control of
communicable diseases, the administration of public health care,
and some public safety issues.  The DEC is delegated the authority
to regulate environmental threats to health, including public health
nuisances.
Alaska’s boroughs and cities are delegated various public
health powers based on their particular statutory classification un-
der state law.  However, Alaska Native villages and tribal groups
owe their legal existence, and many of their public health powers,
to the federal government.  Congress previously assumed direct re-
sponsibility for the provision of health care to tribal governments.
More recently, Congress encouraged the direct involvement of
tribal governments in planning and operating health programs.
While the federal-tribal relationship is strong, the United States
Supreme Court has confirmed that Alaska has primary jurisdiction
over tribal lands.11  Nevertheless, the extent of state influence over
tribal governments is conditioned upon the recognition of a federal
partnership with tribal governments.  This dual recognition of
tribal health authorities as federal partners and local governments
raises questions concerning the responsibilities for the public
health that these tribal governments share with state and other lo-
cal governments.
Part IV discusses the benefits of a public health law improve-
ment process and our proposals for reform.  Despite political limi-
tations of the legislative approach, legal reform may advance public
health by (1) defining the purposes and objectives of public health;
(2) authorizing and limiting public health actions within a permissi-
10. See ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 4.
11. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 533
(1998).
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ble degree of local flexibility; (3) serving as a tool of prevention to
create healthier conditions; and (4) facilitating the planning and
coordination of governmental and non-governmental health activi-
ties.  Many benefits could be achieved through a public health im-
provement process, including the following:  updating antiquated
laws; incorporating modern scientific understanding of diseases and
unhealthy conditions; modernizing current standards; and, perhaps
most importantly, clarifying the legal powers, duties, and relation-
ships of various state, local, and tribal actors.
Law reform in Alaska should express a clear vision for public
health, promoting the best theories and practices in public health.
Public health regulations should be based on uniform provisions
that apply equally to all health threats.  This would eliminate the
unnecessary fragmentation of laws according to the type of disease
or condition to be regulated.  Public health interventions should be
based on the degree of risk, the cost and efficacy of the response,
and the burden on human rights.  Authorities should be empow-
ered to make decisions based upon the best available scientific evi-
dence concerning the nature and extent of risks to the public health
and have a wide range of powers to accomplish their mission.  Im-
plementing a graded series of flexible alternatives allows for the
protection of the public health without devaluing individual rights.
To further privacy protections, public health authorities should ad-
here to fundamental information privacy practices, which have
been incorporated into our Model State Public Health Privacy
Act.12  These practices include:  (1) providing justification for data
collection; (2) sharing information about aggregate data collection
by public health departments and its purposes; (3) eliminating se-
cret data systems; (4) allowing persons to access data about them-
selves; (5) ensuring the reliability and accuracy of data; (6) attach-
ing legally binding assurances of privacy to all personally -
identifiable information such as non-disclosure provisions; (7) es-
tablishing security protections for data; and (8) imposing penalties
for unauthorized disclosures.
Finally, we recommend that the state’s primary executive pub-
lic health agencies, the DHSS and DEC, should formalize their
channels of communication and coordination.
12. See Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Model State Public Health
Privacy Project (last modified Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.critpath.org/msphpa/
privacy.htm>.
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II.  A FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
Conceptualizing public health law is not easy.  Lawmakers,
judges, health officials, scholars, and others have often viewed
public health law as being at the intersection of other disciplines,
including health law, health care law, law and medicine, forensic
medicine, environmental law, and bioethics.  This Article will treat
public health law as a distinct discipline.  As one public health law
treatise surmised in 1926
[public health law] should not be confused with medical juris-
prudence, which is concerned only in legal aspects of the applica-
tion of medical and surgical knowledge to individuals. . . .
[P]ublic health is not a branch of medicine, but a science in itself,
to which, however, preventive medicine is an important con-
tributor.  Public health law is that branch of jurisprudence which
treats of the application of common and statutory law to the
principles of hygiene and sanitary science.13
Thus, while public health law is conceptually linked to the
fields of law and medicine, and health care law, it is itself a distinct
discipline susceptible to theoretical and practical differentiation
from other disciplines at the nexus of law and health.14  In this sec-
tion, we briefly define public health law within a constitutional
framework and demonstrate the various governmental responsibili-
ties and powers relating to public health consistent with our defini-
tion.
A. Defining Public Health Law
Historically, public health has been associated with the control
of communicable diseases and the improvement of unsanitary or
unsafe conditions in the community.15  Public health is actually
more encompassing.  Modern definitions of public health vary
widely, ranging from the World Health Organization’s utopian
conception of the ideal state of physical and mental health16 to
definitions that merely list common public health practices.17  The
IOM has proposed one of the most influential contemporary defi-
nitions of public health, which, though simply stated, is quite accu-
13. JAMES A. TOBEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:  A MANUAL OF LAW FOR
SANITARIANS 6-7 (1926).
14. See GOSTIN, supra note 3.
15. See TOBEY, supra note 13, at 3.
16. See, e.g., LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & ZITA LAZZARINI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE AIDS PANDEMIC 27-30 (1997).
17. See, e.g., CHARLES EDWARD ARMORY WINSLOW, THE EVOLUTION AND
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MODERN PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGN (1923).
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rate:  “Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to as-
sure the conditions for people to be healthy.”18
Building on this definition of public health, we define public
health law as follows:
the study of the legal powers and duties of the state to assure the
conditions for people to be healthy (e.g., to identify, prevent,
and ameliorate risks to health in the population), and the limita-
tions on the power of the state to constrain the autonomy, pri-
vacy, liberty, or other legally protected interests of individuals
for protection or promotion of community health.19
From this definition, five essential characteristics distinguish public
health law from the fields of medicine and law:  (1) Government:
Public health activities are the primary responsibility of govern-
ment, rather than the private sector; (2) Populations:  Public health
focuses on the health of populations, rather than the clinical im-
provement of individual patients; (3) Relationships:  Public health
contemplates the relationship between the state and the population
(or between the state and individuals who place themselves or the
community at risk), rather than the relationship between the physi-
cian and patient; (4) Services:  Public health deals with the provi-
sion of public health services, rather than personal medical serv-
ices; and (5) Coercion:  Public health possesses the power to coerce
the individual for the protection of the community and, thus, does
not rely on a near universal ethic of voluntarism.  Although these
broad parameters help distinguish public health law from other
fields, it is necessary to further examine the concept of public
health law through our constitutional system of government.
B. Constitutional Authority for Public Health Powers
The United States Constitution is the starting point for any
analysis concerning the distribution of governmental powers.  The
Constitution divides power among the three branches of govern-
ment (separation of powers); limits government power (to protect
individual liberties); and allocates power among the federal gov-
ernment and the states (federalism).20  In the realm of public
health, the Constitution acts as both a fountain and a levee.  It
originates the flow of power to preserve the public health and it
curbs that power to protect individual freedoms.21
18. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 19.
19. GOSTIN, supra note 3.
20. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1-6 (1997).
21. See JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 520 (2d ed.
1996).
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1. Separation of Powers.  The Constitution separates the
federal governmental powers into three branches:  (1) the
legislative branch is vested with the power to create laws; (2) the
executive branch is vested with the power to enforce the laws; and
(3) the judicial branch is vested with the power to interpret the
laws.  States have similar schemes of governance pursuant to their
own constitutions.  By separating the powers of government, the
Constitution provides a system of checks and balances that is
thought to reduce the possibility of government oppression.
The separation of powers doctrine is essential to the field of
public health law, for each branch of government possesses a
unique constitutional authority to create, enforce, or interpret
health policy.  The legislature creates health policy and allocates
the necessary resources to effectuate it. Some contend, however,
that legislatures are unable to balance and make complex public
health decisions.  Legislators may respond too quickly without suf-
ficient fact-finding or consideration of all the implications, lack ex-
pertise in the health sciences, and be influenced by popular beliefs
that may be inconsistent with public health objectives.  Yet legisla-
tors remain politically accountable for their actions, which are bal-
anced with competing claims.
The executive branch significantly impacts public health law
through establishing health policy and regulations, in addition to
enforcing existing public health laws.  Executive agencies at the
federal and state levels are legislatively charged not only with im-
plementing legislation, but with establishing complex health regula-
tions.  Executive branch agencies are uniquely positioned to govern
public health.  They are created for the very purpose of advancing
public health, can focus on public health problems for extended pe-
riods, and may possess significant expertise and resources to ad-
dress these problems.  Conversely, however, agency officials may
focus too narrowly on single topics and may serve for long dura-
tions, inadvertently leading to stagnant policies and procedures,
and complicity with the subjects of regulation.
Through legal interpretation, the judiciary exerts substantial
control over public health policy by determining the boundaries of
legislative and executive government power.  Courts decide
whether a public health statute is constitutional, whether agency
action is authorized by legislation, whether agency officials have
gathered sufficient evidence to support their actions, and whether
government officials and private parties have acted negligently.
The judicial branch has the independence and legal training to
make thoughtful decisions about constitutional claims regarding
such things as individual rights or federalism.  Courts, however,
may be less equipped to critically review the substance of health
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policy choices.  Judges are often considered politically unaccount-
able if not subjected to elections, may be bound by the facts of a
particular case, may be influenced by untested expert opinions, and
may focus too intently on individual rights at the expense of com-
munal claims to public health protection.
2. Limited Powers.  A second constitutional function is to
limit government power to protect individual liberties.
Government actions undertaken to promote the communal good
often infringe upon individual freedoms.  Public health regulation
and individual rights may directly conflict.  Resolving the tension
between population-based regulations and individual rights
requires compromise.  Thus, while the Constitution grants
extensive powers to governments, it also addresses this trade-off
through the declaration of individual rights that the government
cannot infringe without some level of justification.  The Bill of
Rights, together with other constitutional provisions,22 creates a
zone of individual liberty, autonomy, privacy, and economic
freedom that exists beyond the reach of the government.  Public
health law struggles to determine the point at which government
authority to promote the population’s health must yield to
individual rights claims.
This tension is demonstrated in the 1905 United States Su-
preme Court opinion Jacobson v. Massachusetts.23  In Jacobson, the
Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to a general
vaccination requirement for smallpox.24  Massachusetts enacted a
law empowering municipal boards of health to require the vaccina-
tion of inhabitants if necessary for the public health or safety.25  The
Cambridge Board of Health, under authority of this statute,
adopted the following regulation:  “Whereas, smallpox has been
prevalent . . . in the city of Cambridge and still continues to in-
crease; and whereas, it is necessary for the speedy extermination of
the disease . . . ; be it ordered, that all inhabitants of the city . . . be
vaccinated.”26  Henning Jacobson refused the vaccination.  After
his conviction by the trial court, he was sentenced to pay a fine of
22. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10 (federal and state government may not
criminally punish conduct that was lawful when committed); id. art. I, § 10 (no
state shall impair the obligation of contracts); id. art. IV, § 2 (“Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States.”).
23. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
24. Id. at 12.
25. Id. at 12-13.
26. Id.
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five dollars.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the
conviction, and the case was appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court.27  Jacobson argued that “a compulsory vaccination
law is unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and, therefore, hos-
tile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body
and health in such way as to him seems best.”28  He asserted that his
constitutional liberty interests supported the natural rights to bod-
ily integrity and decisional privacy.29
Rejecting Jacobson’s appeal, the Supreme Court adopted a
narrower view of individual liberty.  The Court emphasized a more
community-oriented philosophy in which citizens have duties to
one another and to society as a whole.  Justice Harlan, writing for
the Court, stated:
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States . . .
does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all
times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.
There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessar-
ily subject for the common good.  On any other basis organized
society could not exist with safety to its members.30
Under a social compact theory, “a community has the right to pro-
tect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety
of its members.”31  Justice Harlan concluded this theory is consis-
tent with a state’s traditional police powers which authorize an ar-
ray of governmental action in the interests of public health, among
other priorities.32
The legacy of Jacobson is its defense of police power regula-
tion in support of a strong social welfare philosophy.  However, the
Court also recognized the limits of a broad police power.  Utilizing
state police powers in support of vaccination requirements or other
public health initiatives is constitutionally permissible only if they
are exercised in conformity with the following principles:
(a) public health necessity – Justice Harlan, in Jacobson, in-
sisted that police powers must be based on the “necessities of the
case” and could not be exercised in “an arbitrary, unreasonable
27. See id. at 14.
28. Id. at 26.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 26.
31. Id. at 27.
32. Id.  Police powers refer to the broad power of a sovereign state to regulate
matters affecting the health, safety, and general welfare of the public.  See, e.g.,
ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER:  PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS 3-4 (1904); James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public
Health Law, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 318-20 (1998).
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manner” or go “beyond what was reasonably required for the
safety of the public;”33
(b) reasonable means – The Jacobson Court introduced a
means/ends test that required a reasonable relationship between
the public health intervention and the achievement of a legitimate
public health objective.34  Even though the objective of the legisla-
ture may be valid and beneficent, the methods adopted must have
a “real or substantial relation” to protection of the public health,
and cannot be “a plain, palpable invasion of rights;”35
(c) proportionality – Justice Harlan wrote in Jacobson, “that
the police power of a State . . . may be exerted in such circum-
stances or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in particular
cases as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent
wrong . . . injustice, oppression or absurd consequence.”36  Thus, a
public health regulation may be unconstitutional if the intervention
is gratuitously onerous or unfair; and
(d) harm avoidance – While those who pose a risk to the
community can be required to submit to compulsory measures, in-
cluding vaccination for the common good, the measure itself
should not pose a health risk to its subject.  Requiring a person to
be immunized despite knowing the vaccination would cause harm
would be “cruel and inhuman in the last degree.”37  Jacobson failed
to present medical evidence that he was not a “fit person” for
smallpox vaccination.38
Thus, while Jacobson stands firmly for the proposition that
police powers authorize states to compel vaccination for the public
good, government power must be exercised reasonably to pass con-
stitutional scrutiny.
3. Federalism.  Federalism, as a principle of law and by
governmental design,39 attempts to distribute power appropriately
33. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28.
34. See id. at 28-29; see also JAMES A. TOBEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 90 (2d ed.
1939).
35. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31; see also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525
(1933) (holding that public welfare regulation must not be “unreasonable, arbi-
trary or capricious, and the means selected shall have a real and substantial rela-
tion to the object sought to be attained”).
36. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38-39.
37. See id. at 39.
38. Id.
39. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868); see also WORKING GROUP ON
FEDERALISM OF THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, THE STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN
AMERICA 5 (1986) (“[F]ederalism is a constitutionally based, structural theory of
government designed to ensure political freedom. . .”).
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among federal and state levels of government.40  Pursuant to the
United States Constitution, the federal government has certain
limited powers to enact laws in areas where it has specific
jurisdiction.  To preserve the powers of the federal government
from intrusion by the states, the Supremacy Clause41 provides that
federal laws and regulations override conflicting state laws via the
doctrine of preemption.42  State law is preempted by federal
constitutional or statutory law, either by express provision,43 by a
conflict between federal and state law,44 or by implication where
Congress so thoroughly occupies a legislative field “as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states
to supplement it.”45
With the passage of the Tenth Amendment, states reserved
their sovereign power over “all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the
people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State.”46  These powers, collectively known as police powers, give
states broad jurisdiction to regulate matters affecting the health,
safety, and general welfare of the public.47
The distinction between federal and state powers is not always
predictable in application.48  Even though the distribution of pow-
ers among governments was originally meant to be relatively
clear,49 federal and state government powers interact on a regular
40. See, e.g., The Court and Federalism, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2000, at A26
(“The proper question [of federalism] is whether . . .  policy issues [are being] ad-
dressed by the appropriate level of government, [not] which level is likely to de-
liver a particular favored outcome.”).
41. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
42. See id.
43. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
44. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981); New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
654 (1995).
45. Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see
also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977).
46. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at
292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
47. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (stating that
“the task of ascertaining the constitutional line between federal and state power
has given rise to many of the Court’s most difficult and celebrated cases.”).
49. See, e.g., K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2 (1947); see also
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (stating that federalism involves “a
proper respect for state functions . . . [and] the belief that the National Govern-
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basis.  It is precisely at the point when these powers collide that
federalism takes on many shades and gradations.50
Issues of federalism can be classified by two broad categories.
The first category encompasses state intrusions into the federal
sphere.  These include instances where states seek to intrude on the
constitutional authority of the federal government (e.g., enacting
laws that interfere with congressional regulation of interstate
commerce)51 or fail to recognize federal supremacy or authority
(e.g., attempting to impose taxes on federal goods).52  Such exam-
ples of state intrusion into the federal sphere proliferated during
the nation’s early years as states tested the limits of their sovereign
powers.
The second category includes federal intrusions into tradi-
tional state duties.  Originally, federal legislation that involved ar-
eas traditionally left to the states was viewed as beyond Congress’
jurisdiction and, therefore, did not trump state law.53  However, the
expansion of the federal government during the New Deal relaxed
such traditional notions of federalism.54  Arguments stemming from
ment will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways”).
50. See, e.g., Alan R. Arkin, Inconsistencies in Modern Federalism Jurispru-
dence, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1569 (1996).
51. See, e.g., South Carolina Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S.
177 (1938) (upholding the constitutionality of a South Carolina law that prohibited
trucks over 90 inches wide or weighing over 20,000 gross pounds on state highways
despite infringement on interstate commerce).
52. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (invalidating
Maryland’s attempt to tax the issuance of bank notes by the newly created federal
Bank of the United States).
53. States were considered essential to the functioning of government because
they retained the majority of powers.  See A REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
FEDERALISM, supra note 39, at 10.  So powerful were the states under the original
balance of power among the national and state governments that Alexander
Hamilton commented “there is greater probability of encroachments by the
[states] upon the federal [government] than by the federal [government] upon the
[states].”  Id. at 9 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
157 (1992) (stating that “the Federal Government undertakes activities today that
would have been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the
Framers would not have conceived that any government would conduct such ac-
tivities; and second, because the Framers would not have believed that the Federal
Government, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities” (empha-
sis added)).
54. See, e.g., Daniel S. Herzfeld, Note, Accountability and the Nondelegation
of Unfunded Mandates:  A Public Choice Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth
Amendment Federalism Jurisprudence, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419 (1999).
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federal intrusion over states typify, though not exclusively, modern
debates in an era of new federalism.55  Increasingly, federalism has
been the focal point of political56 and judicial issues.  The United
States Supreme Court has played a major role in setting a new
frontier of federalism.57  Beginning with the Court’s 1976 decision
in National League of Cities v. Usery,58 new federalism cases have
resulted in significant changes in the Court’s jurisprudence.  These
changes include (1) adoption of a powerful rule against federal in-
55. The term “new federalism” may have first been used by Donald E. Wilkes,
Jr., in his article, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure:  State Court Evasion
of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974).  See Richard C. Reuben, The New
Federalism, ABA J., Apr. 1995, at 76-77 (the resurgence of federalism is partially
the result of increased political efforts of the states to move toward greater auton-
omy from the federal government and the effects of such efforts on the political
processes on Capitol Hill); see also Juliet Eilperin, House GOP’s Impact: Trans-
forming an Institution, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2000, at A4 (chronicling the failures of
former House of Representatives Speaker, Newt Gingrich, Eilperin comments
that “while Gingrich had once hoped to lead the country from the speaker’s chair,
some of the changes he set in motion may well diminish the legislative branch’s
power in the years to come by transferring power to state and local govern-
ments”).
56. Although several state governors failed in their 1994 effort to organize a
“Conference of States” to draft federal constitutional amendments in support of
greater state rights, see William Claiborne, Supreme Court Rulings Fuel Fervor of
Federalists, WASH. POST, June 28, 1999, at A2.  Several bills have been introduced
that would require it to consider federalism issues prior to the passage of legisla-
tion.  See Ron Eckstein, Federalism Bills Unify Usual Foes, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 18,
1999, at 1.  In August 1999, President Clinton signed the second draft of his execu-
tive order concerning federalism.  This initial draft of the order was roundly re-
jected by state and local government associations for its failure to reflect appro-
priately new federalism principles.  See David S. Broder, Federalism’s New
Framework, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1999, at A21.  The revised order disfavors fed-
eral preemptive laws or policies, requires executive officials to defer to states
whenever possible in setting national standards, and features an enforcement
mechanism against implementation of federal executive policies that lack a feder-
alism “impact statement.”  See id.
57. See David S. Broder, Challenge for the States, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1999,
at A19; see also Claiborne, supra note 56.
58. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding Congress lacked the jurisdictional power un-
der the Commerce Clause to regulate the wages and hours of public employees
engaged in integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions
through the Fair Labor Standards Act); see also Robert H. Freilich & David G.
Richardson, Returning to a General Theory of Federalism:  Framing a New Tenth
Amendment United States Supreme Court Case, 26 URB. LAW. 215 (1994).
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vasion of core state functions;59 (2) presumption against application
of federal statutes to state and local political processes; 60 (3) disdain
for federal action that “commandeers” state governments into the
service of federal regulatory purposes;61 (4) rejection of federal
claims brought by private parties against states62 for overtime
wages,63 patent infringements,64 engaging in false advertising,65 and
to resolve gambling disputes,66 and (5) adoption of the “plain
statement rule” that Congress must “express its intention to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the
statute itself,”67 when its action may alter the balance of federal-
ism.68  Most recently, the Court opined that state employees cannot
sue states for violations of the Federal Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act69 because Congress exceeded its power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the state’s immunity under
59. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as beyond congressional authority
under the 14th Amendment pursuant to a challenge based on the decision of a lo-
cal zoning authority to deny a church a building permit); see also United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding Congress lacked the commerce power to en-
act the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, making criminal the knowing posses-
sion of a gun by a student while at school).
60. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
61. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (declaring unconstitutional
the federal requirement under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that
state chief law enforcement officers temporarily conduct background checks on
prospective handgun purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
“Take title” incentive provisions of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985 are constitutionally invalidated where they re-
quire states to (1) either regulate pursuant to Congress’ directions or (2) take title
to, and possession of, the radioactive waste generated in-state or become liable to
waste generators for all damages from the state’s failure to take the wastes.  Both
of these “options” are unconstitutional based on principles of federalism because
Congress cannot require states to implement legislation according to federal direc-
tives nor “commandeer” states into the service of federal regulatory purposes.  See
id.
62. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Justices, 5-4, Strengthen State Rights, WASH. POST,
June 24, 1999, at A1.
63. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
64. See Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
65. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-secondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
66. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
67. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
68. See Gregory v. Ashroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991).
69. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
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the Eleventh Amendment70 when it attempted to subject states to
such suits.71 The majority of these cases concern the second classifi-
cation of federalism issues, when federal intrusion into predomi-
nantly state matters exceeds the limits of federal powers.  How-
ever, new cases before the Court evince atypical federalism
disputes where states and private parties have aggressively begun
to challenge issues under the federal domain.  For example, in its
first term of the new century the Court will decide whether (1)
states can impose environmental regulations on oil tankers that
are stricter than federal law (which the Court recently concluded
that states cannot);72 (2) private parties can bring state personal in-
jury claims against automobile manufacturers who failed to install
airbags in the late 1980s despite preemptive federal legislation and
regulations that allowed manufacturers to install either automatic
seatbelts or airbags;73 and (3) states can enforce state laws that pro-
hibit state purchasing agreements with companies doing business in
objectionable international locales (based on their authoritarian
governments, human rights issues, or other criteria), in possible
contravention of the federal constitutional power to regulate for-
eign affairs.74
By any account, new federalism has mobilized the Tenth
Amendment as a vehicle for challenging federal statutes that com-
pel state legislative or administrative action.  As a result, some fed-
eral public health laws may be vulnerable to state challenges on
Tenth Amendment grounds.  For example, future challenges may
include environmental regulations that direct states to adopt or en-
force a federal regulatory scheme75 or loosely preemptive federal
70. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any For-
eign State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
71. See Linda Greenhouse, Age Bias Case in Supreme Court Opens a New
Round of Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999, at A25; see also Joan Biskupic,
Court Curbs Suits By State Workers; Continuing Pattern, 5-4 Ruling Bars Claims of
Age Bias Under Federal Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2000, at A11.
72. See International Ass’n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053
(9th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000).
73. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236 (D.C. Ct. App.
1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 33 (1999).
74. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999),
cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999); see also Joan Biskupic, High Court to Review
Mass. Law on Burma, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1999, at A4; Linda Greenhouse, Jus-
tices to Decide Foreign Policy Question in Massachusetts Boycott of Myanmar,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at A20.
75. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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laws76 that invade core state concerns in public health.  The fol-
lowing discussion explores the constitutional authority and exercise
of public health powers of federal, state, and local governments.
a. Federal Powers.  Before an Act of Congress is deemed
constitutional, two questions must be asked:  (1) does the
Constitution affirmatively authorize Congress to act, and (2) does
the exercise of that power improperly interfere with any
constitutionally protected interest?77
In theory, the United States is a government of limited, de-
fined powers.  In reality, political and judicial expansion of federal
powers through the doctrine of implied powers allows the federal
government considerable authority to act in the interests of public
health and safety. The federal government may employ all means
reasonably appropriate to achieve the objectives of constitutionally
enumerated national powers.78  For public health purposes, the
chief powers are the power to tax, spend, and regulate interstate
commerce.  These powers provide Congress with independent
authority to raise revenue for public health services and to regu-
late, both directly and indirectly, private activities that endanger
human health.
b. State Police Powers.  Despite the broad federal presence in
modern public health regulation, states have historically and
contemporaneously had a predominant role in providing
population-based health services.  States still account for the
majority of traditional spending for public health services,
excluding personal medical services and the environment.79  The
Tenth Amendment of the federal Constitution reserves to the
states all powers not otherwise given to the federal government nor
prohibited to the states by the Constitution.80
The police power represents the state’s authority to further a
primary goal of all government: to promote the general welfare of
society.  Police powers can be generally defined as “[t]he inherent
authority of the state (and, through delegation, local government)
to enact laws and promulgate regulations to protect, preserve and
76. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
77. See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism & Public Health
Law, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 311 (1998).
78. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323-24 (1819).
79. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 178-83.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the peo-
ple.”81
To achieve these communal benefits, the state retains the
power to restrict, within federal and state constitutional limits, pri-
vate interests--personal interests in liberty, autonomy, privacy, and
association, as well as economic interests in freedom to contract
and uses of property.82  Police powers in the context of public
health include all laws and regulations directly or indirectly in-
tended to improve morbidity and mortality in the population.  Po-
lice powers enable state and local governments to promote and
preserve the public health in areas ranging from injury and disease
prevention,83 to sanitation and water and air pollution.84
c. Local Powers.  In addition to the significant roles federal
and state governments have concerning public health law in the
constitutional system, local governments also have important
public health interests.  Public health officials in local governments,
including counties (or boroughs), municipalities, and special
districts, are often on the front line of public health dilemmas.
They may be directly responsible for assembling public health
surveillance data, implementing federal and state programs,
administering federal or state public health laws, operating public
health clinics, and setting public health policies for their specific
populations.
To the degree local governments set local public health priori-
ties, they do so pursuant to specific delegations of state police pow-
ers.  Local governments in the constitutional system are recognized
as subsidiaries of their state sovereigns.  As a result, any powers lo-
cal governments have to enact public health law or policies must be
delegated from the state.  Such delegation of power, which may be
narrow or broad, provide local governments with a limited realm of
authority, or “home rule,” over public health matters of local con-
cern within their jurisdiction.  This delegation of power may be
protected against withdrawal or infringement by state constitutions
or statutes.  Absent constitutionally--protected delegation of power
to local governments, however, states may modify, clarify, preempt,
or remove “home rule” powers of local government at will.
81. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Reforming Alaska Public
Health Law, A Report for the Alaska Public Health Improvement Process 3 (1999)
(on file with authors).
82. See Hodge, supra note 77, at 318-30.
83. See TOM CHRISTOFFEL & STEPHEN P. TERET, PROTECTING THE PUBLIC:
LEGAL ISSUES IN INJURY PREVENTION 25-28 (1993).
84. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 34 (1968).
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Exercises of local authority in the interests of public health
cannot extend beyond limited jurisdictional boundaries or conflict
with or impair federal or state law.  As a result, the role of local
governments in public health law is largely limited by federal and
state laws and regulations that local governments must adhere to in
setting or implementing public health policies.
III.  PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IN ALASKA
Having defined public health law and framed it within the con-
text of the constitutional system of American government, we turn
to an examination of public health law in Alaska.
Alaska’s public health system is deeply complex, with intricate
relationships among the federal government (including the Indian
Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and
the Environmental Protection Agency), state government (primar-
ily the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services and De-
partment of Environmental Conservation), local governments (in-
cluding boroughs and municipalities), and tribal organizations.  We
cannot attempt to delineate all of the intricacies of these varied
agencies and their roles in Alaska public health.  Rather, we ex-
amine Alaska public health powers under the Alaska Constitution,
state statutory law, municipal law, and tribal law, consistent with
our definitional and conceptual approach.
A. The Alaska Constitution
Like the federal Constitution, the Alaska Constitution sets
limits on the powers of the state while providing affirmative grants
of governmental powers.  The Alaska Constitution explicitly guar-
antees many of the same or similar guarantees of individual rights
set forth in the federal Constitution.  These rights include due pro-
cess rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;85 equal pro-
tection;86 freedom of religion87 and speech;88 and a prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.89
The Alaska Constitution also provides additional protections
of individual rights through provisions not explicitly stated in the
federal Constitution.  Notable among these additional protections
85. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7.
86. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3.
87. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4.
88. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5.
89. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14.
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in Alaska is an explicit constitutional right to privacy90 pertaining to
governmental intrusions.  The scope of state privacy rights is
largely undefined91 and dependent on the circumstances.92  Alaska
courts have interpreted the state constitution to provide broader
privacy protections than the federal constitution.93  The right, how-
ever, is not absolute.94  Provided government can show that an in-
fringement of the right to privacy is justified by a legitimate and
compelling governmental interest, government action is likely con-
stitutional.95
Unlike the federal Constitution and most other state constitu-
tions, the Alaska Constitution explicitly authorizes the state legisla-
ture to “provide for the promotion and protection of public
health”96 and “provide for public welfare.”97  While these provisions
seemingly require the State legislature to act to protect public
health and promote the public welfare, the degree and manner in
which public health goals are accomplished are largely left to the
discretion of the legislative body.  As a result, Alaska public health
law and regulations are defined by the State legislature.
Concerning the right to privacy, these provisions have been in-
terpreted to establish a presumption of validity of traditional
measures taken by government in the interests of public health.98
Consequently, the constitutional right to privacy in Alaska does
not undermine many legitimate public health activities, like disease
surveillance, reporting of infectious diseases, the abatement and
control of nuisances, and registration of persons who pose threats
to the public health.99  These privacy rights may, however, protect
the privacy of individuals within their homes against unnecessary
infringements by the State, even though such actions may arguably
further public health objectives.  In Ravin v. State, for example, the
Alaska Supreme Court upheld the right of individuals to use mari-
juana in the privacy of their own homes without governmental in-
terference in the form of criminal prosecutions. 100  The court sub-
90. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is rec-
ognized and shall not be infringed.”).
91. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1975).
92. See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978).
93. See Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska 1980).
94. See State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 22 (Alaska 1978).
95. See Messerli, 626 P.2d at 84.
96. ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 4.
97. Id. § 5.
98. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 510 (Alaska 1975).
99. See Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994).
100. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 510.
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sequently rejected a similar claim concerning the personal use of
cocaine within the home, finding a sufficiently close and substantial
relationship between the criminalization of the more dangerous
substance, cocaine, and the legitimate governmental purpose of
preventing harm to individuals and the public health.101
Pursuant to the state constitutional right to privacy, the Alaska
legislature has enacted laws to protect the confidentiality of per-
sonal medical and public health records.102  Though the State has
declared virtually all information held by state agencies and de-
partments to be public records open to inspection, it specifically
exempts from disclosure “medical and related public health rec-
ords.”103  Health information privacy protections are often coupled
with anti-discrimination protections that prohibit discrimination
against individuals on account of their physical or mental disabili-
ties.104
The Alaska Constitution also authorizes the legislature to or-
ganize the state into organized and unorganized boroughs105 (simi-
lar to counties), and incorporated cities within these boroughs.106
Boroughs and cities are delegated liberal “home rule” powers to
exercise legislative powers not otherwise prohibited by or inconsis-
tent with state law.107  Statutory law enacted pursuant to this consti-
tutional authorization further defines and classifies boroughs and
cities,108 and clarifies the extent of their home rule authority.109
101. See State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 23 (Alaska 1978).
102. ALASKA STAT. § 9.25.120 (LEXIS 1997).
103. Id. § 9.25.120.
104. Although the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12201 (1992), presents a solid foundation of anti-discrimination protection, Alaska
has statutorily provided additional protections.  The Alaska State Commission for
Human Rights (within the Office of the Governor) is statutorily authorized to
promulgate regulations consistent with the legislature’s general prohibition of in-
dividual discrimination in employment, credit practices, places of public accom-
modation, or the sale, lease, or rental of real property against persons on the basis
of race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age, physical or mental disability, mari-
tal status, pregnancy, or parenthood.  ALASKA STAT. §18.80 (LEXIS 1997).
105. See ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 3.
106. See id. § 7.
107. See id. §§ 1, 10, 11.
108. ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.03 et seq. (LEXIS 1997).
109. See infra Part III.C.
HODGE.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/08/00  9:09 AM
100 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [17:1
B. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions of Public Health Law
in Alaska
Pursuant to explicit constitutional authorization, the Alaska
Legislature has enacted an array of statutes that generally author-
ize various state and local governmental agencies to regulate and
carry-out traditional public health functions.  Many of these stat-
utes, and some significant state constitutional provisions, are sum-
marized in the Table below.
TABLE OF ALASKA’S PUBLIC HEALTH LAWS110
Provision Legal Citation Brief Description of Citation
Right to Privacy ALASKA CONST.
art. I, § 22.
“The right of the people to pri-
vacy is recognized and shall not
be infringed.”
Promote Public Health ALASKA CONST.
art. VII, § 4.
“The legislature must provide for
the promotion and protection of
public health.”
Public Welfare ALASKA CONST.
art. VII, § 5.
“The legislature shall provide for
public welfare.”
Public Health Records--
exception to right of
inspection
ALASKA STAT.
§ 9.25.120
(LEXIS 1999).
Every person has right to inspect
public records in the state, unless
prohibited by other provisions.
Education--Physical Exam
and Immunization
§ 14.30.120
§ 14.30.125
Physical exams shall be delivered
to child’s parent.  School district
shall require children attending
school be immunized if ordered
by the Commissioner of Health
and Social Services.
Health and Personal Safety
Education
§ 14.30.360 “Each state public school system
shall be encouraged to initiate a
program in health education for
kindergarten through grade 12.”
110. This Table presents an index of significant Alaska state public health laws
in order of appearance among statutory titles in the State’s official statutory re-
porter, ALASKA STATUTES (LEXIS 1999).  It does not include references to fed-
eral laws, state administrative laws, tribal laws, local ordinances, or case law of
public health significance in Alaska.  For these reasons, this Table should not be
viewed as a complete listing of Alaska public health laws, but rather as a guide to
those Alaska constitutional and statutory laws which significantly relate to the
regulation in the interests of public health.
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Fish Health Inspections § 16.05.868 Fish health inspections shall be
performed as necessary.
Department of Health and
Social Services (“DHSS”)
Administration
§ 18.05.010 DHSS shall “administer the laws
and regulations relating to the
promotion and protection of the
public health, control of commu-
nicable diseases,” and mater-
nal/fetal health.
DHSS--Reports § 18.05.020 DHSS shall prepare an annual
report of activities.
Planned Parenthood § 18.05.035 DHSS shall distribute planned
parenthood information.
Fetal Health Effects and
Pregnancy
§ 18.05.037 DHSS shall make available in-
formation on fetal health effects
during pregnancy for distribution
to patients.
Public Health Regulations § 18.05.040(a)(1) DHSS shall adopt regulations
consistent with existing laws for
diseases of public health signifi-
cance.
Persons with Impairments § 18.05.044 DHSS shall maintain a registry of
consenting persons with impair-
ments.
Board of Health – Office of
Planning and Research
§ 18.07.021 This office “shall administer the
certificate of need program . . .
and perform other functions.”
Emergency Medical
Services
§ 18.08.010 “The department is responsible
for the development, implemen-
tation, and maintenance of a
statewide comprehensive emer-
gency medical services sys-
tem . . . .”
Health Units and Districts
(Districts, Local Health
Board, Municipal
Corporations, Native)
§§ 18.10.010 et
seq.
Establishes health units in unin-
corporated areas and designates
consolidation into health districts.
Tuberculosis § 18.15.120 “DHSS may establish a compre-
hensive program for the control
of tuberculosis in the state. . . .”
Blood Tests and Prenatal
Blood Test
§ 18.15.150 A blood sample shall be taken for
testing at a pregnant woman’s
first professional visit or within
ten days thereafter.
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Phenylketonuria (“PKU”) § 18.15.200 A physician or nurse attending a
delivery shall test the child for
phenylketonuria.
Hospital Regulation § 18.20.010 Designed to provide for the de-
velopment, establishment and en-
forcement of standards for the
care and treatment of individuals
in hospitals and related health
care centers.
Nursing Facilities § 18.20.300 “[T]o ensure that the quality of
care in nursing facilities in this
state is maintained at a high stan-
dard in accordance with applica-
ble state and federal law and
regulations . . . .”
Patient Access to Records § 18.23.005 “[A] patient is entitled to inspect
and copy any records . . . per-
taining to the health care ren-
dered to the patient.”
Electronic Medical Records § 18.23.100 Health care providers may main-
tain and preserve medical records
in an electronic format.
Department of Health and
Social Services
§ 18.26.020 Creates Alaska medical facility
authority to promote health and
general welfare by finding means
of financing medical facilities.
Community Health Aid
Program
§ 18.28.010(c)(1) Grant may be used for training
primary community health aids.
Asbestos § 18.31.010 Coordinates efforts of state de-
partments and agencies to abate
asbestos health hazards in
schools.
Public Accommodations § 18.35.010 Authorizes DHSS to maintain
health standards in places of pub-
lic accommodation.
Regulation of Public
Smoking
§ 18.35.305 Designates places where smoking
is prohibited.
Radioactive Materials § 18.45.030(1) DHSS shall study the public
health hazards of radioactive ma-
terials in the state.
Vital Statistics §§ 18.50.010 et
seq.
DHSS shall accumulate vital sta-
tistics.
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Accident and Health
Hazards; Accident
Prevention
§ 18.60.010(b) Authorizes a program to reduce
the incidence of work-related ac-
cidents and health hazards in the
state.
Employee Safety Education
Programs
§ 18.60.066 Requires employers to conduct a
safety education program for em-
ployees who may be exposed to
toxic or hazardous substance or
physical agent.
Council on Domestic
Violence and Sexual
Assault
§ 18.66.010 Provides for planning and coordi-
nation of services to victims of
domestic violence and sexual as-
sault.
State Commission for
Human Rights
§ 18.80.050 Commission shall adopt regula-
tions relating to discrimination
because of physical or mental dis-
ability.
Mammogram Coverage § 21.42.375 Health care insurers shall cover
low-dose mammography screen-
ings.
Cervical and Prostate
Cancer Detection
§ 21.42.395 Health care insurers shall cover
the costs of cervical and prostate
cancer screenings.
Local Air Quality Control
Program
§ 29.35.055 Municipalities may establish a
local air quality control program
by ordinance.
Local Alcohol Regulation § 29.35.080 Municipalities may regulate the
sale and consumption of alcoholic
beverages.
Local Reporting of
Hazardous Wastes
§ 29.35.500 Municipalities may create a pro-
gram for the reporting of hazard-
ous chemicals, materials, and
wastes.
Inventories of Hazardous
Materials
§ 29.35.530 Requires municipalities to inven-
tory hazardous substances.
Hazardous Waste
Information
§ 29.35.540 Information about hazardous
wastes shall be made readily
available to the public for in-
specting and copying.
DHSS Duties § 44.29.020 DHSS shall administer state pro-
grams of public health and social
services.
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Department of
Environmental
Conservation (“DEC”) –
Declaration of Policy
§ 46.03.010 “[C]onserve, improve, and pro-
tect [Alaska’s] natural resources
and environment and control wa-
ter, land, and air pollution, in or-
der to enhance health, safety and
welfare of the people of the
state.”
Alaska Environmental Plan § 46.03.040 DEC shall formulate and annu-
ally review a statewide environ-
mental plan.
Hazardous Waste
Reduction Matching Grants
§ 46.03.317 Establishes hazardous waste re-
duction grants.
Regulation of Pesticides and
Broadcast Chemicals
§ 46.03.320 DEC may regulate the trans-
porting, testing, inspection, pack-
aging, and labeling of pesticides
and chemicals.
Operation of Sewer and
Water Facilities
§ 46.03.720 A person may not construct and
operate a sewer system or treat-
ment works without approval.
Pesticides; Oil Pollution §§ 46.03.730-740 A person may not spray DDT or
other commercial pesticides, or
discharge oil products.
Water Nuisances § 46.03.800 A person may not befoul, pollute,
or impair the quality of water
used for domestic purposes.
Air and Land Nuisances § 46.03.810 A person may not publicly de-
posit any matter that would be
“obnoxious or cause the spread of
disease or in any way endanger
the health of the community.”
Definitions of DEC Terms. § 46.03.900 Defines air, water, soil, and other
environmental terms.
Solid and Hazardous Waste
Management Practices
§ 46.06.021 DEC shall promote waste source
reduction, recycling of waste, and
waste treatment and disposal to
minimize threats to human health
and environment.
Village Safe Water Act § 46.07.010 Establishes a program “to pro-
vide safe water and hygienic sew-
age disposal facilities in villages in
the state.”
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Hazardous Substance
Release Control
§ 46.09.010 Persons handling hazardous
wastes must report releases to
DEC and other appropriate pub-
lic safety agencies.
Hazardous Substance Spill
Technology Review Council
§ 46.13.100 Council shall assist in identifica-
tion of containment and cleanup
products and procedures.
State Air Quality Plan § 46.14.030 DEC shall act for the state in any
state air quality control plan de-
veloped.
Publication of Records and
Confidentialty
§ 47.05.020 DHSS may adopt regulations
concerning records and the dis-
closure of such information.
Misuse of Public Assistance
Records
§ 47.05.030 A person may not “solicit, dis-
close, receive, make use of, or
authorize . . . the use of, a list of
or names of or information con-
cerning, persons applying for or
receiving the assistance.”
Public Policy—Children § 47.05.060 To secure for each child the care
and guidance that will serve the
moral, emotional, mental and
physical welfare of the child and
community.
Medical Assistance--
Purpose
§ 47.07.010 “[T]he needy persons of this state
receive uniform and high quality
medical care, regardless of race,
age, national origin, or economic
standing.”
Catastrophic Illness
Assistance
§ 47.08.010 DHSS may reimburse providers
of medical care for unpaid costs
due to treatment of catastrophic
illness.
Child Abuse and Neglect § 47.17.010 Requires the reporting of child
abuse cases.
Developmentally Delayed
Children - Early
Intervention and Family
Support Services
§ 47.20.060 Provides funding to certain chil-
dren who exhibit or are at risk for
developmental delays or disabili-
ties.
Community Mental Health
Services
§ 47.30.056 Establishes the Alaska Mental
Health Trust Authority to ensure
a comprehensive mental health
program.
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Alcoholism and Drug
Abuse Treatment Act
§ 47.37.020 Organizes and administers treat-
ment services for persons with
alcohol and drug problems.
Payment Costs of Prenatal
Services
§ 47.40.100 Requires DHSS to pay the cost of
prenatal services that are not
available from an existing state or
federal program for pregnant
women with social or economic
difficulties.
As in most states, there are multiple state agencies in Alaska
which regulate in the interests of public health.  These agencies in-
clude the Department of Labor (which is primarily responsible for
occupational safety and health); the Department of Commerce and
Economic Development (which provides for licensure of physicians
and nurses); and the Department of Public Safety (which provides
support for victims of domestic violence and sexual assault).
Most traditional public health functions in Alaska are per-
formed directly by one of two state agencies, the Department of
Health and Social Services (“DHSS”)111 and the Department of
Environmental Conservation (“DEC”).112  As summarized below,
the respective duties and functions of these state agencies are dis-
tinguished by the general legislative intent underlying the agency’s
establishment.  DHSS is primarily responsible for regulating public
health matters related to the control of communicable diseases,
administration of public health care, and some issues of public
safety.113  The DEC protects the environment and the state’s natu-
ral resources by establishing regulations and inspecting premises
where polluting activity occurs.114
1. Department of Health and Social Services.  DHSS and its
many divisions, including the Division of Public Health, are headed
by the Commissioner of Health and Social Services.115  Most
111. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.29.010 et seq. (LEXIS 1999); see also Alaska
Health and Social Services Online (visited Mar. 30, 2000)
<http://www.hss.state.ak.us>.
112. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.46.010 et seq. (LEXIS 1999); see also Alaska De-
partment of Environmental Conservation (visited Mar. 30, 2000)
<http://www.state.ak.us/dec>.
113. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.020 (LEXIS 1999).
114. See id.
115. See id. § 44.29.010 (LEXIS 1997); see also Alaska Health and Social Serv-
ices Online- Division of Public Health (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.hss.
state.ak.us/dph_home.htm>.
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traditional public health duties and functions are broadly delegated
to DHSS through loosely defined authorizations by the State
Legislature.116  DHSS is authorized to (1) “administer the laws and
regulations relating to the promotion and protection of the public
health”; (2) control communicable diseases; (3) conduct programs
for the improvement of maternal and child health; and (4) perform
“other duties provided by law.”117
Public health duties of DHSS revolve around the administra-
tion of state public health regulations, programs, and initiatives
concerning maternal and child health and welfare services;118 pre-
ventive medical services;119 public health nursing;120 nutrition serv-
ices;121 health education;122 public health laboratories;123 mental
health services;124 management of state institutions (other than cor-
rections facilities) and medical facilities;125 the registration of per-
sons with impairments;126 and “general relief.”127
Additional clarification of the public health functions of DHSS
is legislatively set forth in subsequent sections of the Alaska Re-
vised Statutes, primarily Title 18, “Health, Safety, and Housing.”128
Pursuant to Title 18, DHSS is authorized to oversee the following:
(1) coordination and creation of a statewide emergency medical
services system;129 (2) establishment of a comprehensive program
for the control of tuberculosis130 and other infectious diseases in-
cluding HIV/AIDS;131 (3) accumulation of vital statistics;132 (4)
116. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.29.010 (LEXIS 1999).
117. Id. § 18.05.010.
118. Including, for example, the provision of planned parenthood information,
see id. § 18.05.035, licensing of child care facilities, see id. § 44.29.20(a)(14), regis-
tration of midwifery birth centers, see id. §18. 040(a)(10), and study of fetal alco-
hol effects.  See id. § 18.05.037.
119. See id. § 44.29.20(a)(2).
120. See id. § 44.29.20(a)(3).
121. See id. § 44.29.20(a)(4).
122. See id. § 44.29.20(a)(6).
123. See id. § 18.05.040(8).
124. See id. § 44.29.20(a)(7).
125. See id. § 44.29.20(a)(9).
126. See id. § 18.05.044(a)-(c).  The statute defines persons with impairments as
those with a physical or mental condition that, if not otherwise corrected, materi-
ally limits individual activities or functioning.
127. Id. § 44.29.020(a)(13).
128. See generally id. § 18.
129. See id. § 18.08.
130. See id. §§ 18.15.120-149.
131. See id. § 18.15.310.
132. See id. § 18.50.
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regulation of the quality of hospitals;133 (5) monitoring of asbestos
levels;134 and the health effects of radioactive materials in the
state;135 and (6) coordination with the Alaska Department of Labor
and other agencies for the prevention of occupational accidents
and injuries and the promotion of housing safety.136
These and other public health duties of the Department are
also accompanied by the legislative authorization to enact adminis-
trative regulations that more precisely define the scope and extent
of these powers.  These administrative regulations may have the
binding force and effect of statutory law, but have less force than
federal and state constitutional and statutory laws.
2. Department of Environmental Conservation.  DEC is the
state’s primary environmental protection agency.137  DEC has also
been assigned responsibility for abating public health nuisances
that are primarily environmental in nature.138  Specific duties of
DEC include the following:  (1) coordinating and developing state-
wide environmental policies; (2) establishing standards regarding
air, water, surface, and subcutaneous pollution;139 (3) preventing
public health nuisances;140 (4) maintaining health standards in
places of public accommodation (including the prohibition of
smoking in certain public places);141 and (5) regulating sanitary
practices in the interest of public health, including setting
sanitation standards for a variety of commercial businesses (e.g.,
food handling and manufacturing establishments, industrial plants,
barbers and hairdressers, restaurants, and bars) and non-
commercial establishments (e.g., schools and any “other similar
establishments in which lack of sanitation may create a condition
that causes disease”).142
Various divisions within DEC are responsible for implement-
ing programs consistent with these broad legislative criteria.  The
Division of Air and Water Quality monitors air and water pollu-
133. See id. § 18.20.
134. See id. § 18.31.
135. See id. § 18.45.030(1).
136. See id. § 18.60.
137. See id. § 46.03.020.
138. See FRANK P. GRAD, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW MANUAL 16-17 (1990).
139. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.020(10) (LEXIS 1998).
140. See id.
141. See id. §§ 18.35.010 -365 (LEXIS 1998).
142. Id. § 44.46.020(5)(c).
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tion.143  The Division of Environmental Health is charged with ad-
ministering laws and regulations concerning, among other things,
solid waste management, safe drinking water, environmental sani-
tation, food safety, and pesticide controls.144  Through its Environ-
mental Sanitation and Food Safety Program, this Division inspects
more than 6,000 public facilities across the state to monitor food
and public safety and may assist in epidemiological investigations
of food- and water-borne contaminants.145  The Division of Spill
Prevention and Response regulates in areas of environmental con-
tamination, including underground storage tanks.146  Like DHSS,
DEC has the authority to establish and enforce administrative
regulations.147
C. Municipal/Local Adoption of Public Health Powers
Alaska’s Constitution entrusts the legislature to enact laws
governing the establishment and powers of the state’s boroughs
and cities.  The state’s seventeen incorporated boroughs are classi-
fied as either first, second, or third class.148  Cities in the state may
be designated as first or second class.149  Boroughs or cities may be
further classified.  “Home rule municipalities” are local govern-
ments that have adopted a home rule charter.150  These local gov-
ernments have legislative powers not otherwise prohibited by state
law or charter.151  In addition, boroughs may be classified as “gen-
eral law municipalities,” which include unchartered boroughs or
cities whose legislative powers must be specifically conferred by
state law.152
While Alaska statutory law does not specifically define the
relationship between the state and local governments concerning
143. See Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation – Division of Air
and Water Quality (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.state.ak.us/local/akpages/
ENV.CONSERV/dawq/dec_dawq.htm>.
144. See Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation – Division of Envi-
ronmental Health (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.state.ak.us/dec/deh> (total
public facilities mentioned under “Performance Measures”).
145. See id.
146. See Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation – Division of Spill
Prevention and Response (visited Apr. 14, 2000) <http://www.state.ak.us/dec/
dspar/dec_dspr.htm>.
147. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.020(6)-(10).
148. See id. § 29.04.030.
149. See id.
150. Id. § 29.04.010.
151. See id.
152. Id. § 29.04.020.
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public health responsibilities, the classification of these subsidiary
governmental units is important when examining the degree of
public health powers delegated to the local government.  For ex-
ample, first-class boroughs may proclaim area-wide regulations
concerning water pollution, air pollution, animal control, and the
licensing of day-care facilities, as well as any non-area-wide regula-
tions not otherwise prohibited by state law.153  Second-class bor-
oughs may regulate in similar fashion on an area-wide basis, but
are limited to defined subjects of regulation on a non-area-wide ba-
sis.154  First- or second-class boroughs may acquire additional pow-
ers by holding an area-wide election.155  In 1998, for example, resi-
dents of Kenai Peninsula Borough voted (albeit unsuccessfully)
against allowing the local government to extend animal control
policies to areas outside of the borough’s cities.156
Third-class boroughs, which are the functional equivalent of
special service districts in many states, lack any public health regu-
latory powers absent the power shared by first- and second-class
boroughs to prevent the release of oil or other hazardous sub-
stances in the environment.157  Only one third-class borough exists
in the state.158  No additional third-class boroughs may be created.159
Similar delegations of home-rule powers apply to cities depending
on whether they exist within or outside a borough.160  Cities may
also transfer their powers to the boroughs in which they exist.161
Alaska delegates certain public health functions to all munici-
palities, whether home rule or general law, borough or city.  For
example, any municipality may establish a local air quality control
program;162 regulate the sale and consumption of alcoholic bever-
ages;163 create a program for reporting hazardous chemicals, mate-
rials, or wastes;164 take advantage of incentives in the form of state
153. See id. § 29.35.200.
154. See id. § 29.35.210.
155. See id. § 29.35.300.
156. See Heather A. Resz, Animal Issues Goes to Voters, PENINSULA CLARION,
July 16, 1998, at A1 (on file with authors).
157. See ALASKA STAT. § 29.35.220 (LEXIS 1998).
158. See LOCAL BOUNDARY COMMISSION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ALASKA 5
(1998) (last modified October 1998) <http://www.dced.state.ak.us/mra/Local_
Gov_AK.pdf>).
159. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.05.031(b), 29.06.090(a) (LEXIS 1998).
160. See id. §§ 29.35.250, 260.
161. See id. § 29.35.310.
162. See id. § 29.35.055.
163. See id. § 29.35.080.
164. See id. § 29.35.500.
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funds to establish health facilities and hospitals;165 and receive
grants of state funds to clean-up or prevent oil and hazardous sub-
stance spills.166  Delegations do not include, however, traditional
public health functions such as communicable disease control.
Antiquated state law also authorizes the creation of health
units (defined as a community or settlement outside an incorpo-
rated city) and health districts (comprised of two or more contigu-
ous health units).167  These health units or districts are not assigned
specific duties, other than to report to the Commissioner of Health
and Social Services.168  Despite their authorization under state law,
DHSS reports that there are no functional health units or districts,
as defined by law, in Alaska.169
D. Tribal Public Health Powers
Alaska Native villages predate statehood.170  Their current le-
gal existence and many of their public health powers derive from
the federal government.171  Congress has recognized the unique
status of Alaska’s Native and Indian tribal governments in the con-
stitutional system of government in ways similar to its recognition
of American Indian tribal governments outside Alaska.172
The federal government’s relationship with the American In-
dians is the product of compromise.  In the mid 1800’s, American
Indians executed treaties with the United States that turned over
vast quantities of Indian land to federal control.173  In return,
American Indians were granted limited set-asides of land (reserva-
tions), were allowed to form sovereign tribal governments, and
were to receive direct federal assistance.174  When Russia sold the
territory of Alaska to the United States in 1867, the treaty execut-
ing the exchange secured similar terms for Alaska Natives.175  In
165. See id. § 29.60.120.
166. See id. § 29.60.500.
167. See id. §§ 18.10.010-050.
168. See id. § 18.10.050.
169. See Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Reforming Alaska Public
Health Law, A Report for the Alaska Public Health Improvement Process, 23
(1999) (on file with authors).
170. See A Brief History of Alaska Statehood (1867-1959) (visited Apr. 12,
2000) <http://xroads.virginia.edu/~CAP/BARTLETT/49state.html>.
171. See DAVID S. CASE, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 5 (1984).
172. See id.
173. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 63-66 (1988).
174. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 15-16 (Conference of Western At-
torneys General ed., 2d ed. 1988).
175. See CASE, supra note 171, at 67.
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1971, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”)176 set-
tled all land claims by Alaska Natives and transferred land to state-
chartered Native corporations.177
Pursuant to the Snyder Act of 1921,178 Congress directly as-
sumed responsibility for the provision of health care to tribal gov-
ernments.179  Such federal assistance continues today through long-
term commitments for comprehensive health services administered
by the Indian Health Service (“IHS”) of the federal DHHS, and to
a lesser extent, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”).180  Congress
has legislatively strengthened its commitment to provide health
care benefits to Alaska Natives through the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975181 and the In-
dian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976.182  Together these Acts
clarified federal objectives for the provision of health-related serv-
ices and encouraged the direct involvement of tribal governments
in planning and operating health programs.183
In 1991, Congress began the IHS Tribal Self-Governance
Demonstration Project.184  This Project, which is scheduled to con-
tinue until 2006, specifically authorizes IHS and BIA to execute
agreements (or compacts) with Alaska Natives and American Indi-
ans for the purpose of providing federal funds for health programs
and facilities without significant federal oversight.185  Under this
law, general management and supervision of such programs and fa-
cilities is left to the tribal governments.  In Alaska, many of these
tribal groups collaborated to form the Alaska Tribal Health Com-
pact (“ATHC”), which successfully negotiated a health services
agreement with IHS.186  As a result, the setting of public health
goals and objectives has become a primary responsibility of local
176. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-29 (1994).
177. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 524
(1998).
178. See 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
179. See CASE, supra note 174, at 246-47.
180. See Donald Craig Mitchell, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie:  Statutory
Construction or Judicial Usurpation? Why History Counts, 14 ALASKA L. REV.
353, 401 (1997).
181. See Pub. L. 93-368, 88 Stat. 2206 (1975).
182. See Pub. L. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400 (1976).
183. See Betty Pfefferbaum et al., Learning How to Heal:  An Analysis of the
History, Policy, and Framework of Indian Health Care, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
365, 383-89 (1996).
184. See 25 U.S.C. § 450f (1994).
185. See Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 183, at 387.
186. See Nancy Pounds, Native group ready to take over hospital management in
January, 23 ALASKA J. COM. 1 (1999).
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tribal governments.  This movement toward self-governance was
further solidified with the congressional enactment of the Tribal
Self-Governance Act of 1994.187
Village and group members of the ATHC receive their funds
directly from IHS.188  They can use the funds for specific health
programs within their discretion, provided the spending is consis-
tent with the general conditions for federal funding.189  This flexi-
bility allows local tribal governments to target and respond to dif-
fering health needs across their populations of which they are
aware.  Organizations like the Alaska Native Health Board190 assist
with community-wide planning of health services and needs.191
Despite their distinct existence and relationship with the fed-
eral government, Alaska Natives are also citizens of the state.  In
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,192 the
United States Supreme Court held that non-reservation tribal land
allotted to Alaskan Natives through the Alaska Native Claims Set-
tlement Act of 1971 was not “Indian country,” and thus was not
subject to direct federal jurisdiction and did not form a territorial
basis for certain types of tribal jurisdiction related to the exercise of
general governmental powers.193  The state has civil and criminal ju-
risdiction over the villages and tribal lands of Alaska Natives.194
Consequently, state law generally applies to these residents.
Although the Court’s decision in Venetie confirmed that
Alaska had primary jurisdiction over tribal lands, the extent of
state powers remains conditioned on the recognition of the federal
partnership with tribal governments.195  Tribal health organizations
are registered as state-chartered nonprofit institutions.  However,
to the extent that they originated as federally-sponsored entities,
they have been treated by state authorities as federal facilities for
certain purposes.196  For example, in certain circumstances, health
187. See 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994).
188. See Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v. Shalala, 166 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1999).
189. See id.
190. See Alaska Native Health Board (visited Mar. 30, 2000) <http://www.anhb.
org>.
191. See Alaska Native Health Board – All About ANHB (visited Apr. 10, 2000)
<http://www.anhb.org/sub/about.html>.
192. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
193. See id. at 532.
194. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1162, 1360 (1994).
195. See generally Venetie, 522 U.S. 520.
196. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 169, at 25-26.
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care employees of tribal affiliated health facilities have not been
required to be licensed under state law.197
Less certain are the responsibilities these tribal governments
share with state and local governments for the public health.
Tribal governments undertake public health initiatives with their
federal funds.  Federal monies helped establish the Alaska Native
Epidemiology Center, which surveys rates of disease and other
health conditions among Alaska Natives.198  Tribal governments are
also entitled to apply for state public health grants.  Tribal health
facilities may treat residents other than Alaska Natives.199  Disputes
have arisen as to when and whether tribal governments must ad-
here to state public health initiatives and requirements.  Though
overall responsibility for public health should likely reside with the
state, theoretical and practical issues complicate the achievement
of purely state public health objectives where tribal organizations
dispute state jurisdictional authority or where conflicts arise be-
tween local and tribal governments serving the same community.
IV.  THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IMPROVEMENT PROCESS
Public health law contemplates the responsibilities of indi-
viduals and the duties of government to act for the health of soci-
ety.  As such, public health law serves as a foundation and a
framework for public health activity.  It should assure that public
health agencies are fully capable of responding to current and po-
tential public health threats.  Unfortunately, existing public health
laws too often fail to support health departments in carrying out
their essential services and accomplishing their goals.  Reform of
the law can promote more effective decision-making and protect
individual rights.
Before explaining why public health law improvement can
yield many benefits, it is important to be candid about the limita-
tions of reform.  Public health problems may not be remedied pri-
marily through law reform, but rather through better leadership
and training, improved infrastructure for surveillance and epidemi-
ological investigations, comprehensive counseling and health edu-
cation, and innovative prevention strategies.  In making policy,
public health authorities must consider prevailing social values and
197. See id.
198. See EpiCenter Home Page (visited Apr. 12, 2000) <http://www.anhb.org/
Web%20Site/Epidemiology/index.htm>.
199. See Rose L. Pfefferbaum et al., Providing for the Health Care Needs of
Native Americans:  Policy, Programs, Procedures, and Practices, 21 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 211, 222 (1997).
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respect multiple constituencies, including scientists, politicians, and
community leaders.  Despite these limitations, there are at least
four possible roles for the law in advancing public health.
(1) Law can define the objectives of public health and influence
its policy agenda.  Public health statutes should establish the pur-
poses, goals, and core functions of public health, the personnel and
infrastructure realistically needed to perform these functions, and
budgeting mechanisms to provide reliable levels of support.  By
doing so, the law can inform and influence the activities of gov-
ernment and the expectations of society about the scope and fun-
damental importance of public health.  Courts give deference to
statements of legislative intent and may permit a broad range of ac-
tivities that are consistent with legislative objectives.  No govern-
ment program can be assured full funding during budgetary crises.
However, structuring public health law to embrace defined func-
tions, minimum infrastructure and personnel needs, and funding
mechanisms can provide a yardstick for health departments and
policy makers in the future.
(2) Law can authorize and limit public health actions.  Public
health law must provide broad authority for the exercise of public
health powers and coextensively limit that authority where neces-
sary for the protection of individual rights.  In considering law re-
form, it is important to distinguish between duties and powers in
public health.  The legislature should impose duties on health de-
partments200 to initiate a broad range of activities relating, for ex-
ample, to surveillance, communicable disease control, environ-
mental protection, sanitation, and injury prevention.  It is
important that health officials retain flexibility in the powers used
to achieve public health purposes.  While providing for a flexible
range of public health powers, the law must also place appropriate
limits on those powers to protect human rights.  This is best ac-
complished by adhering to certain strategies including the follow-
ing:  establishing clear criteria for the exercise of compulsory pow-
ers by requiring health authorities to use scientific evidence to
demonstrate a significant risk to the public health; providing pro-
cedural due process for all individuals who face serious constraints
on their liberty; and safeguarding the privacy of individuals and
preventing or punishing invidious discrimination.
(3) Law can serve as a tool of prevention.  Public health law is,
and should remain, a tool of prevention.  Public health law should
200. The term “health department” is used in the generic sense to include all
public health functions carried out by the State, including those in the Department
of Health and Social Services and those in the Department of Environmental
Conservation.
HODGE.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/08/00  9:09 AM
116 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [17:1
use a wide variety of legal means to prevent injury and disease, as
well as enhance health-promoting conditions for the people.
(4) Law can facilitate planning and coordination of govern-
mental and non-governmental health activities.  The private sector
(e.g., managed care and other health insurers, individual health
care providers, and researchers) have an important role to play in
assuring healthy conditions.  The law can foster and encourage this
role for the benefit of public health.
A. Benefits of a Public Health Law Improvement Process
Having observed the role of law in protecting and preserving
the public health, we turn to our analysis of the potential benefits
of legal reform of Alaska public health law.  In Part B, we present
our specific guidelines for legal reform.  First, however, we summa-
rize below some of the fundamental and structural dilemmas of
Alaska public health law, as well as the benefits that can be
achieved through a public health improvement process.201
1. Updating Antiquated Laws.  Many of Alaska’s public
health enabling laws were enacted nearly fifty years ago before
formal statehood.  As such, they are old and antiquated.  Like most
public health laws in the United States, Alaska’s statutes and
regulations have been passed piecemeal in response to specific
disease threats such as tuberculosis, sexually transmitted diseases,
and HIV/AIDS.  Thus, the law has developed, layer-upon-layer,
from one time period to another.  Discussions with public health
authorities in Alaska pursuant to our case study revealed, at times,
confusion about who has what public health powers and when to
exercise those powers.  Given the multiplicity and layering of laws
and regulations concerning Alaska public health law, even the most
expert lawyers have difficulty providing clear answers to public
health officials about their authority to act.  One major benefit of
public health law reform would be to provide greater clarity about
legal powers and duties.
Certainly, older laws are not necessarily bad laws.  A well-
written statute may remain efficacious for many decades.  How-
ever, older laws are often outmoded in ways that directly reduce
their efficacy and conformity to modern legal standards.  Older
laws may not reflect contemporary scientific understanding of dis-
ease, current medical treatments, or constitutional limits on the
States’ authority to restrict individual liberties.
201. See, e.g., Gostin et al., supra note 8.
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When the Alaska public health enabling laws were enacted,
the scientific understanding of diseases was very different than it is
today.  Not surprisingly, public health laws from that era reflect a
more limited understanding of disease and may lack a public health
justification based on contemporary scientific knowledge.  These
laws also predate contemporary developments in constitutional
law, disability discrimination law, health information privacy, and
other modern legal requirements.  At the constitutional level, the
United States Supreme Court now has more exacting standards for
equal protection of the laws, substantive due process, and proce-
dural due process.  Public health powers that affect liberty (e.g.,
quarantine and directly observed therapy), privacy (e.g., reporting
and partner notification), and autonomy (e.g., compulsory testing,
immunization, or treatment) may undergo more careful scrutiny
under the federal Constitution.  At the same time, the federal Con-
stitution may require more rigorous procedural safeguards before
one may exercise compulsory powers.
Federal disability law may be construed to prohibit discrimina-
tion against persons because of a health deficiency, such as an in-
fectious disease.202  This may require health officials to adopt a
standard of “significant risk” before resorting to compulsion.  A
significant risk may be defined as a direct threat “to the health or
safety of others that cannot be eliminated by modification of poli-
cies, practices, or procedures.”203  Thus, under this standard, ad-
verse treatment, such as a decision to use compulsory powers,
would be permitted only if the person posed a significant risk to the
health or safety of others.  A significant risk regarding communica-
ble diseases, for instance, would be determined through “an indi-
vidualized assessment of the mode of transmission, probability of
transmission, severity of the harm, and the duration of infectious-
ness.”204
2. Improving Dialogue.  Alaskans have engaged in
passionate, systematic, and highly constructive conversations about
the public health system.  These conversations have occurred
among various levels of government, public health officials,
community representatives, and other interested individuals.  Even
though true legal reform is not accomplished, the dialogue process
emanating from the state’s public health improvement process is
valuable in many ways.  Careful thought has been put into the legal
202. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Disability Discrimination in America, 281
JAMA 745 (1999).
203. Id. at 246.
204. Id.
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powers and duties of health officials.  Concerns of the Alaskan
people have been expressed and considered by senior health
officials.  Tensions concerning intergovernmental and tribal
relationships have been aired.  The willingness of multiple parties
to reflect on public health improvement in Alaska has educated
health authorities and communities about public health practice
throughout the state.
Perhaps more importantly, the dialogue process has been an
important first step in improving working relationships in public
health throughout the state.  As we examined during our case
study, Alaska is unique in America for the depth and complexity of
its governmental and non-governmental relationships between fed-
eral, state, tribal, and local officials.
Historically, the federal government has been intricately in-
volved in public health in Alaska.  Federal investment was in-
tended to develop the infrastructure of a relatively new state and,
particularly, to fulfill the federal trust commitments made to Native
Alaskans.  As the Indian Health Service completes the transfer of
health care responsibility to tribal authorities, federal involvement
is decreasing, although there remains a need for strong relation-
ships among federal, state, and tribal authorities.
State legislators and public health officials sometimes had
markedly different understandings of the role of government
within public health.  Public health authorities frequently sought
greater freedom to exercise their discretion in matters concerning
the health of the community.  They sometimes perceived legal re-
quirements and the political process as impediments to a well-
functioning health department and expressed concern and distrust
over how legislators would approach public health law reform.
Public health authorities also were concerned about funding and
development of an adequate public health infrastructure.  At the
same time, legislators saw a need for clear criteria and procedures
under which public health officials could operate.  One prominent
legislator in another state objected to “the notion that public health
officials (despite being political appointees) make decisions that
are scientific and good, and legislators make decisions that are po-
litical and bad.”205  The tone of conversations and the relative infre-
quency of prior high-level discussions suggest the need for more
regular communications between public health authorities and leg-
islators which are not merely in response to the latest political is-
sue.
205. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN ET AL., MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND, IMPROVING
STATE LAW TO PREVENT AND TREAT INFECTIOUS DISEASE 6 (1998).
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Given the size and diversity of the state, local dialogue on
public health is critical in Alaska.  Health officials at the state and
local level have cordial and warm relationships and discuss public
health issues regularly.  A lack of regular communication between
these authorities could carry serious implications for the public
health.  If, for example, the State had to discontinue a public health
service because of budgetary constraints or otherwise, local gov-
ernments should be made aware of the decision in order to prepare
for their potential responsibility to provide these services.  Other-
wise temporary, serious gaps in public health services may occur.
Finally, the relationship between the state (and its subsidiary
local governments) and tribal authorities is critically important to
public health in Alaska.  Since the tribes are responsible for many
public health services, there exists a sort of concurrent authority
(state and tribal) to protect the health of Natives.  This requires
careful and deliberate coordination.  Without systematic coordina-
tion and ongoing discussion, occasional mistrust between the two
entities arises.  As a result, some efforts have been made to im-
prove dialogue between state and tribal authorities.  The Rural and
Alaska Native Community and Public Health Advisory Group, for
example, meets regularly to provide a forum for ongoing and de-
liberative discussions among state and tribal representatives. Yet
there remain theoretical differences concerning the roles of the
state and tribal authorities in public health.
From the perspective of some state officials, there is some-
times a need to intervene in Native communities to avert a public
health threat.  However, tribal communities view themselves as
governments with jurisdiction over the land and its peoples.  From
their perspective, the State often fails to provide Natives with suffi-
cient services such as clean water, sewage, and proper sanitation.
These different theoretical visions of state and tribal authority can
lead to mistrust and misunderstanding.  For example, when a
highly knowledgeable, senior-level individual representing Native
Alaskans was asked during our case study if negotiations with the
State would be useful, this person expressed the fear that negotia-
tions with the State inevitably meant concession.
The rich diversity in Alaska is a unique strength.  It is evident
that all groups want the same thing – a vibrant public health pro-
gram.  While the ideals and work ethic of federal, state, tribes, mu-
nicipal public health authorities, policymakers, and others are ad-
mirable, maintaining the lines of active communication is critical.
Communication and coordination should be routine and ongoing,
and not simply in response to public health crises.
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B. Guidelines for Reforming Public Health Law in Alaska
As indicated earlier, 206 whether Alaska should reform its public
health law remains open.  Although the potential exists, law reform
is not the inevitable result of the public health law improvement
process.  While there are many benefits of law reform, there are
also risks.  Once a bill is introduced in the legislature, it can be-
come politicized.  Enacted laws can tie the hands of public health
officials.  For this reason, many public health professionals empha-
size the need for flexibility.  Finally, once the relationships among
various groups are delineated in legislation, great distrust could re-
sult.  Despite these evident risks, we propose the following statu-
tory guidelines for public health law reform, some of which directly
relate to the benefits of a public health law improvement process in
Alaska.
1. Mission Statement:  Essential Public Health Services.  Most
state laws do not give clear authority for all of the essential public
health services recommended by the Institute of Medicine and the
federal Department of Health and Human Services (“DHSS”).207
Alaska’s public health law, like other states, does not articulate a
clear mission for public health, nor does Alaska law spell out core
or essential public health services necessary for serving the state.
Consequently, Alaska law reform should express a clear vision for
public health.  This vision should articulate the best theory and
practice in public health and make a symbolic statement about
assuring the conditions necessary for the health of the people.  This
does not just include personal medical services, but a rich array of
services for disease and injury prevention, and health promotion.
2. Avoid Separate Disease Classifications and Disease-Specific
Laws.  The primary epidemiologic rationale for classifying diseases
and treating them differently is to distinguish between modes of
disease transmission.  However, the origins of this differential
treatment may be better explained by historical and political
influences than by reasoned distinctions or thoughtful strategies.
The result often creates different legal standards and procedures
for different diseases depending on how they are classified.  Public
health law should be based on uniform provisions that apply
equally to all health threats.  Public health interventions should be
based on the degree of risk, the cost and efficacy of the response,
206. See supra Part IV.A.
207. Kristine M. Gebbie & Inseon Huang, Identification of Health Paradigm in
Use in State Public Health Agencies, Columbia Univ. School of Nursing, Center for
Health Policy and Health Services Research (Oct. 28, 1997) (on file with authors).
HODGE.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/08/00  9:09 AM
2000] ALASKA PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 121
and the burdens on human rights that cut across disease
classifications.
Alaska public health law is a complicated amalgam, difficult
for the public to comprehend and challenging for health officials to
implement.  A single set of standards and procedures would add
needed clarity and coherence to legal regulation and might dimin-
ish politically motivated disputes about existing and newly emer-
gent diseases.
3. Base Public Health Decisions on the Best Scientific
Evidence of Significant Risk.  In combatting public health threats,
health officials need clear authority and flexibility to exercise
powers, as well as sufficient guidance.  Consequently, an effective
and constitutionally sound Alaska law requires a rational and
reliable way to assess risk and establish fair procedures.  Alaska
public health law should give public health authorities the power to
make decisions based upon the best available scientific evidence.
Public health officials should examine scientific evidence in the
following areas:  (a) what is the nature of the risk (e.g., the mode of
transmission)? (b) what is the probability that the risk will result in
harm? (c) what potential severity of harm does the risk present?
and (d) what is the duration of the health risk?  Provided health
officials act with a good foundation in science, they should be
supported by public health law.
4. Provide a Flexible Range of Powers for Public Health
Authorities.  Good public health law should give health officials a
wide and flexible range of powers to accomplish their mission.
This would range from coercive measures such as isolation,
licensure, removal, and nuisance abatement, to directly observed
therapy, cease and desist orders, and requirements to attend
courses for counseling, education, and treatment.  It would also
include a full range of powers for health promotion and education.
By giving health officials a flexible and graded series of
alternatives, public health can be protected and individual rights
promoted.
Public health law must set forth and ensure fair procedures.
The nature and extent of the process required depends upon sev-
eral factors including:  (a) the nature of the interests affected; (b)
the risk of an erroneous decision; (c) the value of additional safe-
guards; and (d) the administrative burdens of additional proce-
dures.  Except in an emergency when rapid response is critical,
public health law should assure a fair and open process for resolv-
ing disputes about the exercise of powers and authority.
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5. Data Protection:  Public Health Data Needs and Privacy
Considerations.  The collection, storage, maintenance, and use of
vast amounts of information about the health of populations are
among the core functions of public health.  Surveillance is one of
the most important duties of public health, permitting early
identification of health threats, targeted delivery of prevention
services, and links to treatment and other services.208  Public health
law must enable, encourage, and fund a strong public health
information infrastructure.
The collection of large quantities of personally identifiable
data, however, creates privacy concerns.  Increasingly, health in-
formation is being stored in electronic form.  Users can access this
data more easily than ever before.  A resulting tension between
public health information and privacy is evident in emerging tech-
nologies often referred to as “telemedicine.”  Due to the size of
Alaska and its remote rural populations, Alaska is at the forefront
of telemedicine.  This will require the State to meet challenges re-
lating not only to privacy, but to issues of quality control, licensure,
and liability.
Statutory provisions governing data collection and privacy
must seek to satisfy two goals that at times conflict:  ensuring up-to-
date information for public health purposes and protecting that in-
formation from inappropriate disclosure.  Balancing these com-
peting goals can be accomplished only through the implementation
of policies and practices consistent with set, statutory guidelines.
These guidelines have been drafted within the context of our
“Model State Public Health Privacy Project,”209 sponsored by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Council of
State and Territorial Epidemiologists.  With the assistance of a
multi-disciplinary panel of public health, privacy, and governmen-
tal experts, we have produced a model state public health privacy
law, which, if passed, will codify privacy and security principles
concerning the use and disclosure of public health information.
The model act only concerns personally-identifiable data (because
non-identifiable data pose no or minimal individual privacy con-
cerns) and is based on the following broad principles:
(a) Justification for Data Collection.  Public health authorities
must justify their need for identifiable data, although they should
208. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The “Names De-
bate”:  The Case for National HIV Reporting in the United States, 61 ALB. L. REV.
679, 689-724 (1998).
209. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Model State Public Health
Privacy Project (last modified Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.critpath.org/msphpa/
privacy.htm>.
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have great flexibility in making this showing.  Valid justifications
would include:  surveillance, disease monitoring, epidemiological
(and related) research, preventing a public health risk, and pro-
viding services for the community, including interventions in
avoiding and ameliorating public health threats.
(b) Community Access to Information.  A community should
be generally informed about aggregate data collection by public
health departments and its purposes.  Even where information is
non-identifiable, people should generally be aware of the type of
data collection undertaken by public health departments.  Aggre-
gate public health data should be made accessible by community
members for virtually any purpose.
(c) Fair Information Practices.  Fair information practices de-
mand that no secret data systems exist, that persons have access to
data about themselves, and that public health officials should en-
sure the reliability and accuracy of the data.
(d) Privacy Assurances.  Legally binding assurances of privacy
should attach to all personally-identifiable information.  Public
health officials should maintain confidentiality and ensure a secure
data system.  Unwarranted disclosures should be prohibited.  This
does not mean that public health officials should be restricted in es-
sential health uses of data.  Rather, they should have wide flexibil-
ity in using data for all important public health purposes.  Thus,
public health officials could share information across professional
job descriptions and programs provided the information is neces-
sary to achieve a valid public health purpose.
Penalties should exist for unauthorized disclosure for non-
public health purposes.  Legal protections should prevent unau-
thorized disclosure to commercial marketers, employers, insurers,
law enforcement, and others who might use the information for in-
consistent, unwarranted, discriminatory, or commercial purposes.
The model act permits all legitimate public health uses of data
for the common good, but prohibits potentially discriminatory use
of personal data.  This gives public health authorities discretion to
protect human health, and it gives communities a sense of fairness
and privacy protection.  The solution is not perfect.  Conflicts will
continue to arise.  Yet the model act recognizes both public health
and privacy interests, and seeks fair resolution in law.
6. Improving Coordination Between the Department of Health
and Social Services and the Department of Environmental
Conservation.  DHSS and DEC share responsibility in Alaska for
ensuring the public health.  As a result of this dual system of public
health responsibility, it is important that these agencies coordinate
their efforts.  Each requires the expertise and power held by the
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other to fully accomplish the public health mission.  Some public
health functions undertaken by these agencies overlap to some
degree.  For example, the broad authority of DHSS to control
public health diseases intersects with DEC’s responsibility for
monitoring and preventing food- and water-borne contaminants in
the interests of public health.  Some infectious diseases, such as
hepatitis A and crypto sporidium, may be spread through
contamination of food or water supplies, thus requiring potential
action from both agencies to monitor and prevent their spread.
For the most part, this dual system of public health regulation
works well.  Each department performs its functions and draws
from the considerable expertise within the department.  Where one
department has particular resources, it is usually willing to lend its
expertise to the other.  While dual responsibility will in some cases
work to better the public health, conflicts of agency authority and
action may arise should these agencies fail to communicate and co-
ordinate their efforts toward accomplishing public health goals.
Surprisingly, Alaska public health law does not include formal
procedures for the ongoing dialogue and sharing of information be-
tween these agencies.  The State should improve coordination of
public health services by establishing formal structures to promote
communication and coordination between DHSS and DEC.  This
could include regular meeting times for high-level discussions, sys-
tematic coordination of complimentary functions, and planning for
population-based public health services in the state.  Stronger rela-
tionships, coordination, and dialogue between these two govern-
mental entities, as well as others within the public health system in
Alaska, would likely improve the public health.
V.  CONCLUSION
Alaska is unique in many ways.  It is a relatively new state, it
has a distinct and highly innovative sense of community health, and
many public and private groups in the state are intensely interested
in public health.  This provides an important opportunity to im-
prove the public health system, including the public health law in-
frastructure.  We have attempted in this Article to examine Alas-
kan public health law systematically and provide meaningful
guidelines for legal reform.  As recommended, some of these re-
forms may require statutory alteration, while others may emanate
from the resolution of judicial cases or through administrative
regulations.  However, a major benefit of the public health law im-
provement process in Alaska may not be the guidelines themselves,
but the process by which they are produced.  Alaska public health
officials have dedicated themselves to an intense process of educa-
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tion and inquiry.  Alaska is tentatively developing Phase III of its
public health law improvement process, which will include educa-
tion, continued dialogue, dissemination, due deliberation, and pos-
sible implementation of public health reforms.  The public health
benefits to date have already been well worth their efforts.  We
recommend Phase III to ensure the continued progress of the
Alaskan public health improvement process.
